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 Full-length article in: JLT 10/1 (2016), 110–138. 
Some narratives are explanatory, and some explanations are given by narrating. But are there 
explanations which are explanatory because they are narratives, as many seem to think? In this 
paper, I analyse and reject the idea that such special, narrative explanations exist. 
Since the concepts of narrative and explanation are contested, both concepts need to be 
explicated in order to investigate whether narrative explanations exist. As for explanation, the 
idea that some narratives are explanatory because they are narratives is often expressed by 
saying that the narrative form contributes to the explanatory force of the explanation. 
Unfortunately, the notion of explanatory force is but a rather vague picture. It is not entirely 
clear what a contribution to explanatory force might consist in. After explicating what counts 
as an explanation, I therefore propose to substitute the notion of explanatory force by a more 
precise account. The one that is chosen for the purposes of this paper (but not the only possible 
choice) is van Fraassen’s account: explanations are seen as at least answers to how-questions 
or why-questions which are relevant for the explanandum in the right way. From this, the tasks 
follow for anyone claiming that some explanations explain because they are narrative: an 
explanation which is explanatory because it is a narrative should, firstly, be an answer to a why- 
or how-question which is relevant to the explanandum in a way that can be traced back to 
defining or typical features of narratives. Secondly, the explanation should not be reducible to 
other well-known ways in which explanations can be relevant for their respective questions, 
such as causality. Thirdly, the explanation should be able to deal with the typical problems of 
theories of explanation, i. e. they should be able to deal with the canonical list of problem cases 
for any theory of explanation from the debate in the philosophy of science. 
My explication of the notion of narrative already stands in this context. In order to find 
relevance relations between answers to how/why-questions and explananda which could make 
an explanation essentially narrative, I search popular conditions for ›narrative‹ given by 
Lamarque, Henning and Ryan. ›Narrative‹ has been defined in quite different ways. Definitions 
of ›narrative‹ especially differ in complexity. Lamarque’s definition is chosen because it is 
minimal in this respect. Henning’s definition, on the other hand, is arguably the most complex 
definition available at the moment. To show that these definitions probably exhaust the possible 
candidates for relevance relations, they are complemented by a list of definitorial features by 
Ryan, who in turn compiled many modern definitions. The three definitions of ›narrative‹ give 
us a list of six relevance relations: sequentiality, i. e. a narrative explanation is explanatory 
because it lists a sequence of events leading up to the explanandum; meaningful connection, i. 
e. a narrative explanation is explanatory because it shows the explanandum to be connected to 
other events in a meaningful way; storyness, which consists in the combination of the first two 
candidates; intentionality, i. e. a narrative explanation is explanatory because it gives someone’s 
reasons for bringing about the explanandum; dramaticity, i. e. a narrative explanation is 
explanatory because it puts the explanandum at the end of an emotional sequence; and 
closure/completeness, i. e. a narrative explanation is explanatory because it puts 
theexplanandum at the end of a story. 
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In the main part of the paper, these inherently narrative candidates are then identified in the 
literature on narrative explanation, and I subsequently ask whether they can provide a relevance 
relation between explanandum and explanans which fulfils the three conditions given above for 
any explanation that is explanatory because it is narrative. As it turns out, none of them fulfils 
even the first two of the three conditions. Essentially, three types of problems befall the 
candidates. Some, like sequentiality, cannot guarantee that a narrative is explanatory. One can 
provide counterexamples of narrative sequences which are not explanatory. Others, like 
meaningful connection, turn out to be mere placeholder terms for a relevance relation, i. e. they 
do not tell us what the relevance relation consists in. Some candidates can be reduced to well-
known relevance relations like causality, thereby giving up on the idea that narrative 
explanation is different from other types of explanation. Finally, some candidates display a mix 
of all these problems. I conclude that there is no special type of explanation which is explanatory 
because it is narrative. 
The last section of the paper then situates these considerations in their historical contexts, 
starting with Hempel’s theory of explanation. The question is asked why the idea of a special, 
narrative type of explanation seemed attractive in the first place. I come up with three tentative 
answers: the widespread discontent with Hempel’s theory of scientific explanation, the 
availability of narrative as an obvious but allegedly underrated aspect of explanations, and the 
availability of a list of candidates for which narrative explanation was supposed to work. None 
of these historical reasons, however, is ultimately conclusive. 
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